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Got0d Eno!!.ngh to Be Getting OH1 Wjth? The State of
IF'edlera� SenteH1CCQll'\lg [Legns�S1�□os1 9 December 2015

In an era in which the federal legislative process has largely
ceased to function, one flicker of hope in the Stygian gloom
has been the emergence on Capitol Hill of an apparent
bipartisan consensus that federal prisons hold too many
people for too long, and that Congress ought to do some
thing about that. Proposals to address over-incarceration
have been bubbling up for some time-often bearing
impressive lists of co-sponsors from both parties and
endorsements from deep thinkers at both ends of the
political spectrum-and 2015 looked to be the year in which
Congress materially altered federal sentencing and correc
tions policy. In particular, Congress seemed on the brink of
enacting significant limitations on the use of mandatory
minimum sentences and of providing the beginnings of
a more flexible, generous mechanism for back-end release
of federal prisoners. But it now appears that legislation, if
any, will be deferred until 2016.
In itself, delay until after the Christmas recess is no
ground for despair. On the surface, all seems well. Both the
Senate and House Judiciary Committees have approved
bills with "Sentencing Reform Act" as part of their titles,
with further work promised in the spring. Members are
issuing statements extolling their handiwork and lauding
bipartisanship. The White House is signaling its approval
and pressing for passage.
And yet all is not quite as it seems. There remains real
doubt that any sentencing reform, however broad its
apparent support, can overcome the reflexive opposition of
the modern congressman to any measure that could be
labeled soft on crime. And even if some bill can pass, efforts
to appease the ideologically entrenched or politically cau
tious have already restricted the scope of the bills most
likely to succeed to such an extent that some observers are
privately questioning whether they would accomplish
enough to merit real enthusiasm.
This article traces the evolution of the sentencing
reform debate in Congress in 2015. It summarizes and
compares the six major pieces of sentencing legislation
introduced in 2015. It describes the progression from con
ceptually simple, broadly applicable reforms of mandatory
minimum sentences to the regime of complex and highly
restrictive rules relaxing mandatory minimum sentences
for a modest subset of federal defendants found in the bills
that passed the Senate and House Judiciary Committees.
The article summarizes some of the concerns voiced about

the sentencing provisions of the various bills. Finally, it
discusses the three pending bills relating to back-end
release: Senator Bernie Sanders' proposed restoration of
federal parole, the SAFE Justice Act introduced in the
House, and the Corrections Act portion of the Senate's
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015.
In the pages that follow this article are arranged a selec
tion of comments on aspects of these bills from participants
in and informed observers of the ongoing legislative pro
cess, as well as important primary materials, including
summaries and excerpts from the various competing bills.
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I. The Push to Reform Federal Mandatory
Minimum Sentences

Critics of federal criminal justice policy have long focused
particular ire on statutes imposing mandatory minimum
sentences. The basic criticism of these statutes is that they
are crude instruments, commonly triggered by facts like
drug quantity or the mere possession of a weapon, which
bar judicial consideration of the relative culpability or per
sonal circumstances of individual offenders. In truth,
however, the true ground of objection to many federal
mandatory sentences is their sheer length in relation to the
conduct for which they are imposed. A mandatory sentence
of one or two or three years for a non-violent drug seller is
one thing. Mandatory sentences of five, ten, fifteen, or
twenty-five years-which are scattered liberally throughout
portions of the federal code-are quite another. The com
bination of inflexibility and length has meant that a good
many federal inmates who look little or nothing like the
"drug kingpins" or "armed career criminals" for whom
lawmakers imagined they were reserving these penalties
are serving long mandatory sentences, at great expense to
the public fisc and little obvious benefit to the common
weal.
A. Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015

If one objects to mandatory minimum sentences on prin
ciple and for all crimes, the obvious solution is to erase
them from the federal code. On February 3, 2015, Senators
Patrick Leahy (D-VI) and Rand Paul (R-KY) introduced the
Justice Safety Valve Act of 2015 (reproduced in its entirety
later in this Issue'). Representatives Bobby Scott (D-VA)
and Thomas Massie (R-KY) introduced corresponding leg
islation in the House. If enacted, it would grant judges the
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unfettered authority to sentence defendants below any
prescribed minimum sentence so long as the judge felt it
necessary to accomplish the general objectives of punishment enumerated in 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a).
Unsurprisingly, the Leahy-Paul and Massie-Scott bills
have gone nowhere. A Congress in which both houses are
controlled by Republicans, even Republicans convinced
that some reform is needed, was never going to pass a bill
that ceded to judges absolute control over sentence length
for every crime. Nor, in my own view at least, would reversion to the era of unfettered judicial discretion that preceded
the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 be
sound policy. Complete abandonment of legislatively prescribed minimum punishments is no more sensible than
the present regime of rampant overuse of overlong minimums. Even if one agrees that punishment for crime should
take some account of the particular circumstances of each
offense and the personal attributes of each offender, it does
not follow that society should be barred from requiring some
minimum measure of atonement based solely on the gravity
of the crime. It may be daft for a legislature to require a firsttime non-violent dealer of a tiny quantity of crack to spend
five years in prison, but it would be equally daft to bar the
legislature from decreeing that one who commits premeditated murder must serve a set, and substantial, term of years
for taking another life, or from setting a limit on the number
of times a persistent recidivist may reoffend before being
removed from society for a significant period.
Those categorically opposed to mandatory minimum
sentences are prone to make a fetish of either the supposed
imperative of individualization or the supposed inherent
superiority of judges as sentencing decision makers. But
even if one finds neither of these lines of theoretical argument compelling, there remains the undeniable practical
fact that legislatures in the modem era have proven
chronically unable to restrain themselves from passing
mandatory minimum sentencing laws that sweep in too
many offenders and that imprison them for too long. This
being so, meaningful-and politically feasible-reform of
mandatory minimum sentencing laws should embrace two
objectives: (i) where such laws now sweep in defendants
beyond their intended scope, narrow the categories of
defendants eligible for minimum sentences, and (2) where
such laws accurately define, but over-punish, the class of
offender they were intended to reach, reduce the length of
the mandatory sentence.
B. Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015
On February 12, 2015, Senators Mike Lee (R-UT) and
Richard Durbin (D-IL), together with a group of cosponsors including Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Cory Booker
(D-NJ), introduced the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2015.2
Representatives Raul Labrador (R-ID) and Bobby Scott
(D-VA) introduced corresponding legislation in the House.
The bill would both shorten drug mandatory minimums for
many defendants and narrow the class of defendants to
whom other mandatory minimums apply.
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The Act's principal provisions are as follows:
Section 2 would expand the class of defendants eligible for the statutory safety valve of i8 U.S.C.
3553 (0 from those who have no more than one
Guidelines criminal history point to include those
with two or three criminal history points in the
Guidelines' Criminal History Category II.
Section 3 would make the Fair Sentencing Act of
201o (FSA), which reduced mandatory penalties for
crack cocaine offenses, fully retroactive, with the
exception that a defendant who had already sought
and been either granted or denied a sentence
reduction under the Act could not reapply for relief
even if that motion had been denied on the basis that
the FSA was not retroactive at that time.
Section 4 would cut the mandatory minimum drug
sentences now prescribed by 21 U.S.C. 5 841(b) for
domestic manufacture, distribution, dispensing, or
possession with intent to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense controlled substances, roughly in half.
Five-year minimums would be reduced to two years.
Ten-year minimums would drop to five years.
Twenty-year minimums would be cut to ten years.
And the life imprisonment minimum of 5
841(b)(I)(viii) would fall to twenty-five years.
Section 4 would leave the minimum sentences for
importing or exporting controlled substances under
21 U.S.C. 5 9 6o(b) undiminished except for defendants defined as "couriers"-those defendants
"whose role in the offense was limited to transporting or storing drugs or money." The mandatory
sentences of couriers convicted of importation would
be roughly halved.
Importantly, Section 5 of the bill directs the U.S.
Sentencing Commission to amend the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to accord with the changes in
mandatory minimum sentences. This is critical
because the Commission structured the drug
guidelines around the fixed points set by the mandatory minimum'sentences enacted in the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986. 3 The presumable effect of this
directive would be a material downward shift in the
severity of the drug guidelines, as well as the drug
mandatories.
The most striking aspects of the Smarter Sentencing Act
are its conceptual simplicity and its practical workability. Its
authors sought a solution for a single problem: mandatory
minimum drug sentences are too long and apply to too
many people. They solved the problem by cutting most of
the troublesome sentences in half and making the Section
3553 (0 safety valve available to a slightly wider slite of the
defendant population. And they directed the Sentencing
Commission to adjust the Guidelines to reflect the Act's
new set of normative judgments about how much punishment is required for drug offenses.
The political weakness of the Smarter Sentencing Act is
evident from its list of co-sponsors. Most of them are
Democrats, and the Republicans notably shade to the
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libertarian, rather than the traditional law-and-order, wing
of the party. As we will see, an influential body of Republican legislators remains reluctant to reduce mandatory
sentences. Prominent among this group is Senator Charles
Grassley (R-IA), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
without whose assent no sentencing bill can pass his
committee. Accordingly, the Smarter Sentencing Act
languished.
II. The Push for Sentencing Reform Beyond Mandatory
Minimums
A. Safe, Accountable, Fair, and Effective (SAFE)
Justice Act of 2015
Meanwhile, over in the House of Representatives, something quite remarkable was happening. Congressman Jim
Sensenbrenner (R-WI), chair of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland
Security, and Investigations, and Congressman Bobby Scott
(D-VA), ranking member and former chair of the same
committee, had been working for over eighteen months
with a bipartisan Over-Criminalization Task Force 4 on
comprehensive federal criminal justice legislation. On June
25, 2015, they introduced the Safe, Accountable, Fair, and
Effective (SAFE) Justice Reinvestment Act of 2oI5.5
The SAFE Justice Act is remarkable for at least two
reasons.
First, if you lived through the sentencing wars of the
199os, when judicial departures from the guidelines were
anathema to congressional Republicans and the Feeney
Amendment clamping down on them flew through Congress, you remember Mr. Sensenbrenner as the sternest (or
meanest) of the hard liners and Mr. Scott as a leading voice
of the compassionate (or squishy) left. Seeing a sentencing
reform bill co-authored by the two of them is rather like
finding out that Dumbledore and Lord Voldemort have
been chatting over tea and scones down at the Three
Broomsticks about curricular reform at Hogwarts. Sensenbrenner and Scott have explained on several occasions
that they were able to reach such sweeping agreement
because they agreed to set aside politics to focus on criminal
justice reform measures shown by evidence to work, and to
require that every provision in their bill was supported by
data and stakeholder input from the Task Force's findings.
The spirit of constructive cooperation extended beyond the

bill's congressional architects. The SAFE Justice Act was
endorsed not only by liberal sentencing reformers, 6 but
also by the staunchest rock-ribbed conservatives, including
Grover Norquist, Pat Nolan, Richard Vigueire, Newt Gingrich, David Keene (former president of the National Rifle
Association and former chair of the American Conservative
Union), and the American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC). (The Norquist, et al. and ALEC letters are reproduced later in this Issue.7 )
Second, the SAFE Justice Act is substantively impressive. It addresses not only the single issue of mandatory
minimum drug sentences, but an entire range of
concerns about the federal criminal justice system:

over-federalization, of crime, prosecutorial overreach,
excessive use of pre-trial detention, protection of the innocent, use of probationary sentences, mandatory minimum
reform, compassionate release programs for elderly and
sick inmates, encouraging recidivism-reduction programs
in prison, improvements in supervision of defendants on
probation and supervised release, and more. The bill is
particularly noteworthy in its attention to prison programming aimed to lower the risk of reoffending and mechanisms for early release on the bases of compassionate
release, good time credit reform, earned time credit, and
expanded residential drug abuse treatment programs.
The Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Act contains
a number of provisions relating to mandatory minimum
sentences. Unlike the Lee-Durbin Smarter Sentencing Act,
it would not reduce the length of most existing drug mandatory minimums under 21 U.S.C. 84 i(b) and 9 6o(b).8
Rather, the SAFE Justice Act would restrict eligibility for
those sentences to "managers, supervisors, organizers, and
leaders" of drug trafficking organizations of five or more
members. 9 It would also expand the "safety valve" provision of i8 U.S.C. 3 553 (, which permits judges to sentence
certain defendants below the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum, to include not only persons with one or
fewer criminal history points, but also persons with up to
three criminal history points and no prior federal convictions of violent, firearms-related, sex, terrorism, racketeering, or money laundering crimes.' It also creates a safety
valve for drug defendants who committed their offenses
under the influence of mental illness, persistent drug
abuse, or combat trauma, or who acted at the direction of
another and were suffering physical, mental, psychological
abuse, or domestic violence." The Act would narrow the
class of prior drug offenses that trigger mandatory sentencing enhancements for recidivists.' Finally, the Act
would amend I8 U.S.C. 924 to limit the applicability of
twenty-five-year mandatory minimums for second or subsequent offenses. '3

The SAFE justice Act is not perfect, of course. It has
a number of provisions that seem doubtful, and some that
would probably not survive a full committee process or votes
in the House and Senate. Still, taken as a whole, it is a heartening flashback to a time when legislators of differing views
worked together, sought common ground, horse-traded on
points of disagreement, and produced solid, sophisticated,
comprehensive legislation on difficult subjects.
The reach of the Sensenbrenner-Scott production and
the bipartisan character of its support is so impressive that
we have included in this Issue of FSR a section-by-section
summary of most of its provisions and a list of its fifty-eight
co-sponsors.' 4 Sadly, this enumeration seems most likely to
be a tribute to what might have been.
B. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act (SRACA)
of 2015
Despite the near universality of support for significant
reform, there remains, as noted above, a small but
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influential body of opinion holding that really significant
relaxation of federal sentencing law will hobble prosecutors,
release predators to the streets, and increase crime.' 5 This
view carries considerable weight among some congressional Republicans, most notably Senator Charles Grassley
(R-IA) and Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), chairmen
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. Chairman
Goodlatte did not share the broad enthusiasm for the SAFE
Justice Act (even though that bill emerged from a bipartisan
task force he authorized). Senator Grassley signaled early
that he was unlikely to permit anything of similar scope to
move through his committee and that he had substantial
reservations about the simple across-the-board cuts to
mandatory minimum sentences proposed in the LeeDurbin Smarter Sentencing Act. Grassley was not, however, opposed to all reform. As a result, a bipartisan group
of senators labored to produce a bill that, while far more
modest than the SAFE Justice Act, has garnered Senator
Grassley's approval and that of many, if not all, like-minded
conservative senators.
The result of the senators' labors was the Sentencing
Reform and Corrections Act of 2015 (SRACA), 6 which was
approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on October 22,
2os5.'

7

The SRACA is now the most likely vehicle for sen-

tencing reform in the current congress, and thus merits
particular scrutiny. A section-by-section description of the
8
SRACA is included in this Issue.'
The bill has four notable structural features.
First, like the Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Act, the
SRACA addresses both front-end sentencing issues and
recidivism-reducing prison programming qualifying prisoners for modest reduction in prison confinement. In that
respect, the SRACA is broader in scope than either the
Leahy-Paul Justice Safety Valve Act or the Lee-Durbin
Smarter Sentencing Act. On the other hand, the SRACA
sweeps far more narrowly than the Sensenbrenner-Scott
product by omitting many of the SAFE Justice Act's provisions on subjects like over-criminalization, evidence-based
sentencing alternatives, probation and supervised release
reform, and government transparency and accountability.
And, as will be discussed below, the prison programming
and back-end release features of the SRACA are markedly
less generous than the SAFE Justice Act.
Second, also like the SAFE Justice Act, the SRACA
makes retroactive the reductions in crack cocaine sentences
authorized by Fair Sentencing Act of 20io.' 9
Third, in its provisions on mandatory minimum sentences, the SRACA tries to meld the approach of the LeeDurbin Smarter Sentencing Act, which simply cuts the
length of most drug mandatories in half, with the approach
of the Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Act, which
markedly narrows the class of defendants eligible for
mandatory minimums, but largely leaves the length of such
sentences alone. The SRACA cuts the length of some
existing mandatory minimums, notably the enhanced sentences for repeat drug felons and so-called "armed career
criminals."2 0 On the other hand, it leaves unchanged the
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length of the basic quantity-based drug mandatory minimums of 21 U.S.C. 5 841 and 960, but attempts to ameliorate their effects by: (a) expanding eligibility for the
so-called "safety valve" provision of i8 U.S.C. 3553(f
(which exempts certain defendants from mandatory sentences) to defendants with slightly more severe criminal
histories, 2' and (b) creating a second "safety valve" that
narrows eligibility for the ten-year minimums by making
defendants who would otherwise receive ten-year minimums eligible for five-year minimums if they meet a series
of detailed criteria.22
Fourth, although the SRACA purports to narrow eligibility for some mandatory minimum sentences applicable
to repeat drug offenders by limiting qualifying priors to
newly defined "serious drug felonies," rather than the current "felony drug offense," the bill actually expands eligibility for some recidivist mandatories by adding a newly
defined class of "serious violent felonies" to the list of
qualifying priors. It also adds new mandatory minimum
sentences for interstate domestic violence 3 and certain
24
export control offenses.
C. Critiques of Sentencing Features of the SRACA
The public reception of the SRACA has been quite favorable. The Justice Department supports the bill. 2 5 A few law
enforcement groups have opposed it. (See, for example, the
statement of Steven C. Cook, president of the National
Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys, a rump faction of
federal prosecutors unaffiliated with the Justice Department, to the Senate Judiciary Committee later in this
Issue. 6 ) Most observers have described the SRACA as
a groundbreaking departure from decades of unremitting
federal stringency and have acclaimed its spirit of bipartisanship.2 7 These encomiums are not without basis. A bill
supported by both liberal Democrats and conservative
Republicans and aimed at putting federal drug and firearm
defendants into prison for shorter periods and letting them
out of prison sooner seems nearly miraculous. However,
the bill failed to garner the support of five Republican
members of the Judiciary Committee (Senators Perdue,
Hatch, Sessions, Cruz, and Vitter), and their opposition
8
might yet prevent consideration by the full Senate.2 At
a minimum, modifications of the bill may be required to
secure their backing. Accordingly, those who are eager for
sentencing reform, but have doubts about the SRACA's
particulars, have largely stayed silent or murmured only
muted criticisms, fearing that too-pointed critique will
break the spell and ruin a chance for even incremental
reform.
In private, however, well-informed supporters of reform
across the political spectrum are concerned about the particulars of the SRACA. On the sentencing side, they worry
that the SRACA provides less relief from mandatory minimum sentences to fewer defendants than might be supposed, and that the complexity of the mechanisms
employed to restrict the number of eligible defendants will
generate protracted, unnecessary litigation. Progressive
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reformers are particularly distressed that a bill advertised as
limiting mandatory minimum sentences materially
enlarges the class of defendants subject to several commonly employed recidivist minimum sentences by adding
violent crimes to drug crimes as qualifying priors.2 9
Space does not permit a detailed exegesis of all the
technical concerns raised about the sentencing provisions
of the SRACA. However, to illustrate some of the perceived
difficulties, we reproduce in this Issue excerpts from my
comments to Senate Judiciary Committee staff about the
"second safety valve" provision in Section 103 and the
alterations to the Armed Career Criminal Act in Section
105.30 The projected net effect of the SRACA and its House
of Representatives counterpart is addressed in Section III
below.
D. Sentencing Reform Act of 2015-House of
Representatives Version
As noted above, Congressman Bob Goodlatte (R-VA),
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, has been
unwilling to allow full committee consideration of the
Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Sentencing Act. Instead, he
appropriated the first half of Senator Grassley's SRACA,
modified it somewhat to further limit its remedial effect,
and christened it the Sentencing Reform Act of 2015 (SRA).
The Goodlatte SRA mirrors the sentencing portions of the
Grassley SRACA section by section. The only material difference is that the House bill restricts the availability of
mandatory minimum relief even more than the Senate
version, and creates a new consecutive mandatory sentencing enhancement of up to five years for offenses
involving fentanyl, a common cutting agent used in conjunction with heroin. Chairman Goodlatte's bill went to full
committee markup and was approved on November 18,
2015. 3'
Ill. Cul bono? The Shrinking Scope of Mandatory
Minimum Reform
The first point to note about the sequence of sentencing
reform bills recounted above is that in each chamber, each
successive bill provides smaller front-end sentencing benefits to fewer defendants than the one that came before. The
degree of benefit contraction cannot be calculated precisely
because not every one of the bills was "scored" by the
Sentencing Commission or other experts, and because any
scoring effort relies on at least some unverifiable assumptions. (The Congressional Budget Office does not provide
its score, nor a cost estimate on what a bill will cost or save,
until after that bill has been voted out of committee and is
on its way to the floor.) That said, the most recent bills have
been evaluated (roughly) by the Sentencing Commission;
Dr. Paul Hofer, formerly of the Sentencing Commission
and now with the Federal Defenders' Sentencing Resource
Counsel, provides his analysis of the SRACA later in this
Issue;32 and one can get a good idea of the scope of the
earlier bills without detailed statistical analysis.
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A. Justice Safety Valve Act
This bill would permit federal judges to override any
mandatory minimum sentence, leaving the length of sentence imposed to the discretion of the judge. Of the 75,836
defendants sentenced in federal court in FY 2014, 23.6
percent, or 16,048, were convicted of an offense carrying
a mandatory minimum sentence. 33 Just over 42 percent of
this group received relief from the mandatory sentence
through application of a substantial assistance motion
under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e), or the existing safety valve provision of 18 U.S.C. i 3553(A), leaving 9,212 defendants sentenced subject to a mandatory minimum. The Justice Safety
Valve Act would have affected all of these defendants, even
those who ultimately received substantial assistance
motions. One cannot say how much any or all of these
defendants might have benefitted, inasmuch as the absence
of mandatory minimums would have affected some cases
in which plea negotiations produced substantial assistance
motions, and judicial reactions to individual cases would,
by definition, have been variable.
B. Smarter Sentencing Act
The principal beneficiaries of this bill would be drug
offenders (who account for about two-thirds of all cases
carrying mandatory minimum sentences 34 ). The Smarter
Sentencing Act cuts virtually all drug mandatories by
roughly half.35 In 2014, about II,ooo drug defendants
were convicted of crimes carrying mandatory sentences,
and about 5,ooo remained subject to a mandatory at the
time of sentencing3 6 One cannot say precisely how
much these defendants might have benefitted had LeeDurbin been in place. Since over half of them were
sentenced without the constraint of a mandatory minimum, either through substantial assistance motions or
the existing 3553(0 safety valve, one cannot know what
effect halving the original mandatory sentence would
have had. On the one hand, judges are likely to give
a lower sentence if departing from a lower minimum.
On the other hand, the absence of a mandatory floor
does not require a judge to impose a lower sentence.
That said, given the demonstrated propensity of judges
to sentence at or near the minimums in cases where
they apply, and to sentence below the minimum once it
is removed, 37 it is reasonable to assume that the overwhelming majority of the ii,ooo defendants subject to
a minimum would have received some sentence reduction, and that the reduction in prison years served would
be in the multiple thousands per annual cohort of sentenced defendants.
The Smarter Sentencing Act would also benefit a set of
current federal inmates by making the crack penalty
reductions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2oO retroactive.
C. SAFE Justice Act
The number of persons potentially affected by the
Sensenbrenner-Scott bill is harder to estimate because it
does not apply to all offenders with mandatory minimums
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(like the Justice Safety Valve Act) or virtually all drug
offenders with minimums (like the Smarter Sentencing
Act). Rather, it would affect only some persons subject to
drug minimums and some persons subject to minimums
for other offense types. That said, the reach of the SAFE
Justice Act would be broad.
First, the bill's restriction of five and ten-year drug
minimums to "managers, supervisors, organizers, and
-leaders" of drug trafficking organizations of five or
members would benefit the vast majority of drug
defendants sentenced subject to drug minimums. In FY
2014, fewer than 6 percent of all federal defendants
received enhancements for being organizers, leaders,
managers, or supervisors of criminal activity. 38 Even if
the percentage of such persons is materially higher in
drug cases (which by their nature tend to involve group
criminality), this one provision would surely exempt 8o90 percent of drug defendants from mandatory mini-

mums. SAFE Justice also expands the safety valve provision of I8 U.S.C. 3 55 3 (f) by increasing to three the
number of criminal history points a defendant can have
and still qualify, and adds a new safety valve for persons
suffering from mental illness and other conditions.
Conservatively, therefore, one can conclude that SAFE
Justice would exempt from mandatory minimums some
9,0oo of the roughly ii,ooo drug defendants convicted
annually of offenses carrying mandatory minimums, and
that it would provide safety valve relief to some portion
of the remaining 2,000.
The SAFE Justice Act also limits the reach of some
mandatory minimum recidivist provisions relating to firearms crimes. Hence, the total number of SAFE Justice
beneficiaries convicted of drug and non-drug crimes might
reasonably be estimated in the neighborhood of 9,oooio,ooo annually--comparable to, but perhaps somewhat
fewer than, the Smarter Sentencing Act. As with the
Smarter Sentencing Act, the extent of the benefit conferred
by Sensenbrenner-Scott cannot be precisely estimated. And
it bears emphasis that the hypothetical sentence that might
be imposed on a given defendant relieved of a mandatory
minimum sentence by the SAFE Justice Act might not be
any lower than the actual sentence he or she received under
current law, particularly if such a defendant received
a substantial assistance motion or qualified under the
existing safety valve. That said, it would be entirely reasonable to expect a reduction of multiple thousands of
prison years imposed per annual cohort of sentenced
defendants.
The SAFE Justice Act, like the Smarter Sentencing Act,
would also benefit some current federal inmates by making
the crack penalty reductions of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2oio retroactive.

D. Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act (S. 2123)
Estimating the effect of the SRACA is especially difficult
because of its complexity. My best, though crude, estimate
of the effects of its various provisions is as follows:
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Section 101 reduces the length of life and twenty-year
enhanced mandatory minimum sentences for certain prior
drug felons under 21 U.S.C. J 841 and 960, narrows the
scope of the prior drug felonies that trigger the enhanced
minimums from any drug felony to the newly defined category of "serious drug felony," and expands the type of
qualifying prior felony beyond drug crimes to include
"serious violent felonies." This provision provides two
potential benefits to the class of recidivist drug offenders
who now qualify for quantity-based enhanced minimum
penalties under SS 841 and 96o: first, it exempts some
defendants who now qualify for an enhanced minimum,
and second, it reduces the length of the minimums for
defendants who remain subject to them. According to
Sentencing Commission figures, in FY 2014, 436 drug
defendants were theoretically subject to mandatory minimums of more than ten years. 39 However, it is impossible
with the publicly available data to determine how many of
these defendants would be affected by the SRACA. The
Commission's figures do not say how many of the 436
defendants were subject to the quantity-based recidivist
penalties of 21 U.S.C. J 841 and 96o, and how many
involved other triggering factors like causing death or
serious bodily injury, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(i)(A) and
9 6o(b)(i). More importantly, there is no data on how many
of the 436 defendants lack qualifying priors that are "serious drug felonies" under the SRACA such that they would
be exempted from an enhanced mandatory sentence.
The best one can say is that Section roi would benefit
some number of defendants, perhaps as few as some dozens or as many as a hundred or so annually, by entirely
exempting them from the enhanced minimums of S 841
and 96o. It would also benefit another group who would
qualify for recidivist minimums under either current law or
the SRACA by shortening those minimums. The Sentencing Commission estimates the number of this group at 84
per year. 40 But Section ioi would gravely disadvantage an
unknown number of drug defendants with prior "serious
violent felonies" by subjecting them to a previously inapplicable enhanced minimum. The size of that class is
unknown, but potentially quite large, since the definition of
"serious violent felonies" embraces virtually every state and
federal felony with an element of use, attempted use, or
threat of force. In short, it is quite likely that, under the
SRACA, the number of persons subject to S 841 and 96o
enhanced recidivist minimums would be equal to or greater
than is now the case.
Section 102 of the SRACA broadens the existing safety
valve provisions of 18 U.S.C. 3553 (f) by expanding the
category of eligible defendants from those with only one
criminal history point (as defined by the Sentencing
Guidelines) to those who have as many as four points. The
critical caveat is that a defendant may not have either a prior
3-point offense or a prior 2-point drug trafficking or violent
offense. The Sentencing Commission has reported to the
Senate that 3,314 defendants could benefit from this
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provision annually, 4' but I am advised that this figure is
simply an estimate of the total annual number of defendants subject to mandatory minimum sentences who have
2-4 criminal history points. The Commission made no
effort to determine how many of these defendants would be
barred from safety valve relief because they have disqualifying 2-point or 3-point priors. Nor did it estimate how
many of the 3,314 would be disqualified from safety valve
relief by the other provisions of § 3553 (, such as the
requirement that the defendant not use violence or threats
or possess a firearm, cause death or serious bodily injury,
and not be an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
others.
A 3-point prior is any conviction for which a sentence of
more than 13 months was imposed, U.S.S.G. §4AI.I(a). A 2point prior requires only that a sentence of sixty or more
days was imposed, U.S.S.G. § 4 Ai.i(b). Thus, Section 102
excludes from safety valve relief any defendant with a prior
prison sentence of more than thirteen months and any
defendant with a prior misdemeanor or felony sentence of
sixty days or more for any drug or "violent crime," a category that embraces any offense "that has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another." 42 Given that
two-thirds of all defendants eligible for mandatory sentences committed a drug trafficking crime and another
15 percent committed firearms violations, 43 it is not
unreasonable to suppose that a good many of the prior
convictions of such defendants involved drugs or some sort
of assaultive or threatening behavior. Section 1o2 also gives
sentencing judges discretion to award safety valve relief in
these cases if they determine that the defendant's criminal
score "substantially over-represents the seriousness of the
defendant's criminal history or the likelihood the defendant
will commit other crimes." Experience with the longestablished guideline provision permitting downward
departures on this same ground, U.S.S.G. § 4 Ai. 3 , suggests
that federal judges rarely grant relief on this basis.
Accordingly, the annual reach of Section 102, though not
inconsequential, would likely be a good deal smaller than
suggested by the Commission's eligibility estimate of 3,3i 4 .
Paul Hofer suggests that the number would be between
44
5oo and ii44 defendants annually.
Section 103 ofthe SRACA creates a "second safety valve" by
reducing to five years a ten-year mandatory minimum
imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841, 846, 960, or 963, if the
defendant meets a list of conditions. The Sentencing
Commission estimates that this provision could affect 550
defendants annually, 45 while Paul Hofer gives an estimate
of 556.46 I have grave doubts about these figures. Many of
the conditions imposed by Section 103 introduce terms for
which the Commission has no data. Moreover, as I describe
at length elsewhere in this Issue, 47 the conditions are so
numerous and stringent that, if applied as written, precious
few defendants who qualify for a ten-year drug mandatory
can satisfy them.
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To take the simplest of several examples, Section 103
excludes "wholesalers," which it defines as those who "sell
non-retail quantities of a controlled substance to other
dealers or distributors." But everyone eligible for a quantitybased ten-year mandatory minimum has, by definition,
been engaged in manufacturing, distributing, dispensing,
importing, or exporting a non-retail quantity of drugs, or
conspiring to do so, and all of these activities either directly
or indirectly involve the sale of the prohibited substance.
Hence, conviction of the offense triggering the mandatory
minimum automatically disqualifies most, and maybe all,
defendants from relief under Section 103. judges could give
Section 103 wider scope by narrowly construing what it
means to "sell" a drug, but there is no guarantee that they
will.
Section 104 of the SRACA shortens one particularly lengthy
firearm minimum and creates at least a partial solution of
the so-called " 924(c) stacking problem." Title I8 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) prohibits possessing, brandishing, or discharging
a gun in the course of a drug trafficking or violent crime.
Section 924(c)(i)(C) now imposes a twenty-five-year mandatory minimum on a defendant convicted of a second
924(c) violation, and that twenty-five-year sentence must be
served consecutively to any other sentences imposed for the
underlying crime. As the law is now interpreted, the first
924(c) conviction can result from the same case as the
second violation, triggering the twenty-five years. Thus,
a drug trafficker caught with two guns can be sentenced for
the drugs, plus a term for the first 924(c) violation, plus
twenty-five years for the second 924(c) violation. Section
104 requires that the first 924(c) conviction be final before
the second offense triggering the twenty-five-year mandatory is committed.
Section 104 also reduces the length of the penalty for
a second offense from twenty-five years to fifteen years. The
Sentencing Commission estimates that this provision
would impact 62 defendants annually. Paul Hofer puts the
number at 170.48 Neither provides an estimate of the
49
number of defendants affected by the stacking fix.
The benefits conferred by the shortening of the minimum and the amelioration of the stacking problem are,
however, offset by another provision of Section 103 that
expands the class of defendants eligible for the fifteen-year
second offense minimum from those with a previous federal 924(c) conviction to defendants convicted of 924(c)
after being convicted of any state "crime of violence of that
contains as an element.., the carrying, brandishing, or use
of a firearm." The Sentencing Commission does not have
data on how many offenders nationwide have these
convictions.
Section 105 amends the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. 922(g), by reducing its mandatory minimum
sentence from fifteen years to ten years. The Sentencing
Commission estimates that this change would "reduce the
sentence of 277 offenders each year by approximately 21.6
50
percent.
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FIGURE 1: Estimated Number of Beneficiaries of SRACA

52

Defendants Disadvantaged?
No. of Defendants Benefited Annually Annual Estimate
Section 101: Drug recidivists

Sentencing Commission: 84
Bowman: 200

Section 102: Existing Safety Valve

Sentencing Commission:
Hofer: 500-1,144
Bowman: w1,200
Sentencing Commission:
Hofer: 556
Bowman: 0-150
Sentencing Commission:
Hofer: 170
Sentencing Commission:
0

Section 103: "Second Safety Valve"

Section 104: 924(c)
Section 105: ACCA
Section 106: Crack retroactivity

No. of Current Inmates
Benefited by Retroactivity

3,314

Yes / Can't determine number Sentencing Commission:
Max. of 2,265
Hofer: Max. of 4,273
No
0

550

No

0

62

Yes/Can't determine number

Max. of 1,117 eligible

277

No
0

Max. of 2,317 eligible
Max. of 5,826 eligible

A key point about the SRACA is that the provisions of
Sections ioi (reduction of mandatory minimums for drug

924(c) relief track the Senate version, but exclude from
53
relief any defendant with prior "serious violent felonies."

recidivists), 104 (Section 924(c) reform), and io5 (Armed

Career Criminal Act reform) are retroactive to some degree.
Likewise, Section io6 of the SRACA makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 2oio reductions of crack sentences retroactive
and allows defendants sentenced prior to its enactment to
petition for resentencing. The number of inmates who
would actually receive relief under these provisions is very
difficult to determine because of the retroactivity restrictions
in the bill and the fact that sentence reductions for serving
prisoneis are not automatic but require petitioning a court.
For example, the Sentencing Commission says that the
Fair Sentencing Act retroactivity provisions of the House
version of the SRACA would "allow approximately 5,826
offenders currently in federal prison to seek an approximate
20 percent reduction in their sentence. '
' The kicker in
this assessment is the phrase "allow... offenders.., to
seek ...
reduction." All the Commission is really saying is
that there are 5,826 old-law crack offenders still in prison. It
offers no estimate of how many of those offenders qualify
for a reduction or of how many sentence reductions judges
will award.
I estimate the total annual number of actual beneficiaries
of the SRACA as, at most, 2,ooo,almost all of them from the
expansion of the 3553 () safety valve to defendants with 2-4
criminal history points. Even using the Sentencing Commission's numbers of potential beneficiaries, the bill could, at
most, benefit about 4,ooo defendants per year. Against these
numbers must be offset an unknown number of persons not
now subject to mandatory minimums, who would be subjected by Sections ioi and 104 of the SRACA to such minimums and would thus receive longer sentences than they
now do. Finally, roughly 11,5oo current inmates could, in
theory, petition for sentence reductions, although far fewer
than that number would receive such reductions.
E. The Sentencing Reform Act (H.R. 3713)
The impact of Congressman Goodlatte's Sentencing
Reform Act would be roughly the same as its Senate
counterpart, except that it would benefit slightly fewer
defendants. Its provisions on recidivist drug offenders and
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F. Are the Senate and House "Sentencing Reform
Acts" Worthy of Support?
If one was hoping that the ongoing sea change in public and
elite attitudes toward mass incarceration would produce
congressional action of commensurate sweep, the tale of
ever-shrinking legislative ambition in the preceding pages
is discouraging. The version of sentencing reform palatable
to Senator Grassley (S.2123) and Congressman Goodlatte
(H.R. 3713) is far more cramped than the vision embraced
by the broad coalition supporting Sensenbrenner-Scott bill
(H.R. 2944). Even in the single area of mandatory minimum sentences, if one's yardstick is the number of
defendants benefited, the House and Senate "Sentencing
Reform Acts" would affect roughly one-third as many newly
sentenced defendants annually as either the Lee-Durbin
Smarter Sentencing Act (S.502) or the SensenbrennerScott SAFE Justice Act. And the magnitude of the likely
54
effects is probably smaller.
The prevailing mood in both chambers seems to be that
the bills which have made it through committee are the best
that can be achieved, and that to carp too loudly is to risk
failure of the entire enterprise. This could be right. As
detailed above, the SRACA would benefit an appreciable
number of future defendants, might benefit some thousands of current inmates, and would surely save many
millions of dollars over the long term. That is not to be
sneezed at. And the Sentencing Reform Acts we have are
doubtless better than no bill at all. Still, one can at least hope
that the breadth and depth of support for a more comprehensive effort is so great that improvements in the current
bills could be negotiated.
IV. Back-End Federal Corrections Reform in 2015
55
Federal prisons currently hold over 198,ooo inmates.
Materially reducing that number requires not only shorter
sentences at the front end, but sensible programs that
release prisoners back to the community sooner while at
the same time discouraging recidivism. The first half of this
Issue is devoted to efforts by the states to accomplish these
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ends by reforming their parole systems. The federal government abolished parole in 1984. Despite the current
ferment for federal sentencing reform, the idea of resurrecting the federal parole system is not a part of the mainstream reform conversation. However, both the
Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Act and the Senate's
Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act contain extensive
provisions addressed to corrections programming, together
with modest efforts to provide early release.
A. Senator Sanders Tilts at Some Windmills
On September 17, 2015, Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and

Congressman Raul Grijalva (D-AZ) introduced the Justice
Is Not for Sale Act (S. 2054 / H.R. 3543).56 The provisions
that provoked the most headlines at the time were those
that would ban federal funding for privately operated prisons. But the bulk of the bill is devoted to restoring the
federal parole system almost exactly as it existed before the
Sentencing Reform Act of I984. The bill has sparked little
interest outside academic circles and seems profoundly
unlikely to gain any traction in the present Congress.
B. The Corrections Component of the SAFE Justice Act
The Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Act contains a wide
range of reforms to correctional programming and release
protocols. The most significant of these are its mandate that
the Bureau of Prisons create a post-sentencing risk and
needs assessment system, 57 that it formulate an evidencebased case plan for each defendant, and that defendants
would be eligible for ten days sentence reduction for each
calendar month of successful compliance with the prisoner's case plan.

8

Under current law, a defendant must serve

about 87 percent of the sentence initially imposed. These
provisions of the SAFE Justice Act would provide compliant
inmates an opportunity to earn roughly a 30 percent
reduction in their sentences in addition to the good time
credit presently available. Note that these reductions would
accelerate an inmate's outright release, and would not
merely allow substitution of community corrections for
prison time.
The bill would also require that the Bureau of Prisons
provide residential substance abuse treatment for all
inmates with substance abuse problems, 59 provide a oneyear sentence reduction credit for inmates who participate
in cognitive behavioral therapy and/or federal prison
industries, and expand access to compassionate release for
elderly and sick inmates by permitting inmates and sentencing courts to initiate petitions for release (as opposed to
the present system in which only the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons may initiate such a petition). 6,
C.The Corrections Component of the Senate's SRACA
The SRACA is a melding of two pieces of legislative work,
the front-end Sentencing Reform Act and the back-end
Corrections Act devoted primarily to prison programming
and modest early-release mechanisms. The crux of the
corrections section is a directive to the Bureau of Prisons to

create "recidivism reduction" programming, successful
completion of which qualifies inmates for a modest
reduction of the time they are obliged to serve in prison,
substituting instead a period in a residential reentry program, home confinement, or community supervision. 61
The novel component of the bill is that it requires the BOP
to use risk assessment tools to determine which prisoners
will be eligible for the prison programming, and thus who
will be eligible upon completion of that programming for
early release. 62 The bill also includes provisions relating to
juvenile parole, promoting successful reentry, and compassionate release of elderly or terminally ill inmates.
Portions of the corrections section of the SRACA, particularly the juvenile and compassionate release sections,
are quite commendable. However, the back-end release
provisions are problematic. The primary difficulties are
two:
First, the back-end relief afforded to long-serving
inmates is limited. As a threshold matter, it applies only to
first-time federal offenders. And the SRACA does not
actually shorten inmates' sentences. It merely changes the
venue of the last segment of a sentence by releasing qualifying inmates into supervised community settings sooner
than would previously have been the case. Moreover, the
maximum period in prison an inmate can translate to
community confinement by successful navigation of the
program is a year. If the objective is to materially reduce the
population of persons under federal correctional supervision, with concomitant reductions in human and financial
cost, the approach of the SAFE Justice Act, which lets
inmates who have complied with their case plans out of
prison and all other forms of confinement sooner, seems
preferable.
Second, the most widely voiced criticism of the SRACA
corrections regime is its mandate that BOP create a risk
assessment measurement that employs "dynamic" rather
than "static" factors, and then employ this new tool to
determine eligibility for recidivism reduction programs. So
far as I can tell, this approach is unprecedented, advocated
by no correctional expert, and unlikely to work as described
in the bill. We reproduce in this Issue a portion of a critique
by the Federal Defenders of this aspect of the bill.6 3
D. Silence in the House
Congressman Goodlatte did not include a corrections section in the Sentencing Reform Act he moved through his
committee. The future of such legislation in the House is
uncertain. Some have suggested that a separate Goodlatteapproved House bill covering that subject will appear in
2oi6. Others speculate that the House might be moved to
adopt the corrections section of the SRACA.
V. Conclusion
For myself, I hope that some corrections and back-end
release reform can become law in 2o6. However, I am far
more skeptical of the corrections portion of the Senate's
SRACA than of its sentencing portion. The SRACA's
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sentencing measures may be much less expansive than
some might wish, but they will afford some benefit to
a substantial number of current and future federal inmates,
and do so without injury to the federal government's anticrime objectives. The corrections aspects of the SRACA,
however, are very troublesome. The bill's directives to BOP
may prove impossible to implement, and even if implemented, the potential benefit to inmates is so small and so
grudgingly conferred that it seems doubtful that many
inmates will participate. By far the best course for the
House would be to craft its corrections proposal based on
the Sensenbrenner-Scott SAFE Justice Act.
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